



If the laws of nature are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are
forced to deny one of the following:
(A1) Had you chosen differently, no law of nature would have been violated.
(A2) Had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have
been changed.
On the relevant readings, where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your
choice, both of these conditionals appear true. And denying either leads to trouble for
philosophical theories which rely upon counterfactual conditionals—like, for instance,
causal decision theory.
In §1 below, I will explain more carefully why standard theories of counterfactu-
als are forced to deny one of these conditionals at deterministic worlds, and why this
leads to problems for causal decision theory. Then, in §§2–3, I will outline a differ-
ent semantics for counterfactual conditionals. And in §4, I will demonstrate that this
semantics allows us to accept both (A1) and (A2). §5 concludes with some further dis-
cussion of the theory and what it has to say about conditionals like “Had you chosen
differently, it would have been the case that either a law of nature was violated or the
initial conditions were different”.
1 A Puzzle about Causal Counterfactuals
1.1 Causal Counterfactuals
A counterfactual conditional is a claim expressible by a sentence in the following form:
if it were the case that P , then it would be the case thatQ. I’ll abbreviate conditionals
like this with: P  Q. When the antecedent is false, evaluating a counterfactual
conditional requires us to suppose that some part of the world is different, and then to
work out what else about the world would have to change as a result.
In general, there will be many ways of doing this, depending upon which parts of
the world we hold fixed and which we allow to vary. Suppose you stand on the top of
a building with no safety net below. In this context, consider the following dialogue:
Draft of June 29, 2021; Word Count: 12,779
B: dmitri.gallow@acu.edu.au
1 of 31
causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
Me: We’re high enough that, if you were to jump, you would die.
You: I don’t have a death wish! If I were to jump, there would be a safety net, and I
wouldn’t die.
Neither of us appear to have said anything false, but I uttered a counterfactual of the
form pJDq, and you uttered a counterfactual of the form pJ ¬Dq. Assuming
a principle of conditional non-contradiction, these cannot both be true at once.1 (The
principle I have in mind is this: so long as P is possible, ¬[(P Q)∧ (P ¬Q)].
I’ll take this principle for granted throughout.)
The standard resolution is to acknowledge context-sensitivity in counterfactuals.2
My claim held fixed the lack of a safety net, whereas yours held fixed your lack of a
death wish. Because we held different things fixed, we made different claims. You
said something about the necessary causal precursors of your jumping, holding fixed
your lack of a death wish. Whereas I said something about the inevitable causal con-
sequences of your jumping, holding fixed the lack of a safety net.
My focus here is on this second kind of counterfactual, which I will call a causal
counterfactual. In general, causal counterfactuals hold fixed factors which are not
causally influenced by the antecedent.3 (Throughout, then, ‘counterfactual’ always
means ‘causal counterfactual’, and ‘’ always stands for the causal counterfactual
conditional.)
1.2 The Puzzle
There is a puzzle about how causal counterfactuals interact with determinism. This
puzzle puts pressure on us to deny some intuitive counterfactual judgements. And
denying these intuitive judgements leads to powerful objections to philosophical the-
ories formulated in terms of causal counterfactuals.
To appreciate this puzzle: say that laws are deterministic only if two metaphysically
possible worlds satisfying those laws differ iff they have different initial conditions.4,5
And, given some laws, say that there is a miracle iff one of those laws is violated.6
1. This example comes from Jackson (1977, p. 9). Jackson’s reaction to the case differs frommy own; he suggests
that you have confused an indicative conditional for a counterfactual—and that, interpreted as a counter-
factual, your claim is false.
2. Cf. Lewis (1979).
3. Theories of causal counterfactuals like these have been explored by Jackson (1977), Galles & Pearl (1998),
Woodward (2003), Kment (2006), Briggs (2012), Huber (2013), and Hiddleston (2005), among others.
4. Apossible world satisfies some laws iff the laws are true at that world. Likewise, laws are violated at a possible
world iff the laws are false at that world.
5. The initial conditions of the world are just some brief temporal interval at the beginning of the universe (or,
in light of relativity: the past Cauchy development of a Cauchy surface near the beginning the universe).
6. Lange (2000), Braddon-Mitchell (2001), and Kment (2006) have responded to variants of this puzzle by
allowing that it is possible for the actual laws to remain laws at worlds where they are violated. (See Gibbs
(2020) for criticism of this approach.) As I’m using the term ‘miracle’, whether a miracle occurs at another
possible world does not depend upon whether the laws at the actual world are laws at that world. It only
matters whether the actual laws are violated at that world or not.
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Now, suppose the laws are deterministic and unviolated, so that, actually, there are
no miracles. And suppose that you face a choice between two options, which I’ll call
‘a’ (for ‘actual’) and ‘b’. Actually, you choose a. Then, the puzzle is that each of the
following claims are plausible, but they are jointly inconsistent.7 (The fourth claim is
schematic; to endorse it is to endorse all of the claims you get by substituting any claims
for P ,Q,R, and S .)
(B1) If you hadn’t chosen a, there would not have been a miracle.
(B2) If you hadn’t chosen a, the initial conditions would not have been changed.
(B3) For some true P , if you hadn’t chosen a, P wouldn’t have been true.
(B4) If PQ, P R, andQ∧Rmetaphysically necessitates S , then P S .
Pick any true proposition, P . Since the laws are deterministic, there is no metaphysi-
cally possible world at which the initial conditions are unchanged, there is no miracle,
and P is false. So, the initial conditions being the same and there being no miracle
metaphysically necessitates P . So (B1), (B2), and (B4) tell us that, if you hadn’t chosen
a, P would have been true. P was arbitrary, so the same goes for any true proposi-
tion P . So, for any true P , if you hadn’t chosen a, P would have been true. And this
contradicts (B3), given conditional non-contradiction.8
Standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals validate (B4). So they force a
choice between denying (B1), denying (B2), and denying (B3). This is a difficult choice
tomake. If (B3) is false, then it is hard to understand the point of counterfactual think-
ing in a deterministic world. For, if (B3) is false and the world is deterministic, then
nothing counterfactually depends upon your choice. Some incompatibilists may wel-
come this result, insisting that, in a deterministic world, counterfactual thinking has
no role to play in rational deliberation. If you’re determined to choose a, then there’s
no point to deliberating about whether to choose b instead. I disagree—but even if I
concede that we are not free to do otherwise in a deterministic world, and that for this
reason, counterfactuals have no role to play in rational deliberation in a determin-
istic world, we should still be able to adequately explain why things happen as they
do. Whether these explanations are given freely is a separate question from whether
the explanations are any good. But since many good scientific explanations appeal to
counterfactual facts about how some things depend upon others,9 denying (B3) would
undermine our ability to adequately explain in a deterministic world.
At least when it comes to “standard” counterfactuals—which may or may not be
causal counterfactuals, as I’m using the term here—Dorr (2016) denies (B2). Not only
does he deny (B2), he affirms (C2):
7. My presentation of the puzzle closely follows Dorr (2016).
8. I am taking conditional non-contradiction for granted, but not everyone to discuss this puzzle has done
so. In particular, in a letter to Jonathan Bennett, David Lewis proposed—but did not endorse—a semantics
for counterfactuals which allows us to hold on to each of (B1), (B2), and (B3) by denying conditional non-
contradiction along with the principle (B4). See Lewis (2020).
9. See, e.g., Woodward (2003) for the role of counterfactual thinking in causal explanation.
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(C2) If you hadn’t chosen a, the initial conditions would have been changed.
To accept (C2) and similar counterfactuals is to say that, in deterministic worlds, causal
counterfactuals regularly backtrack. As I’ll use the term here, a causal counterfactual
backtracks iff it says that, were things different at some time t, things would also have
been different at some time earlier than t. For instance, on its true reading, your coun-
terfactual “If I were to jump, there would be a safety net” backtracks. It says that, if
you were to jump now, then there would have been a safety net before you jumped,
even though, in fact, there is no safety net. (It’s relatively uncontroversial that this
counterfactual backtracks. What’s more controversial is whether causal counterfac-
tuals backtrack.) Dorr says that standard counterfactuals backtrack all the way to the
initial conditions.10
Many think that (C2) follows from the negation of (B2). They accept the principle
of conditional excluded middle, cem, according to which there is no ‘middle ground’
between PQ and P ¬Q (for any P ,Q):11
(cem) (PQ)∨ (P ¬Q)
However, not everyone accepts cem. This opens up the possibility of denying (B2)
without accepting (C2). Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear to me that this offers a satis-
fying resolution of our puzzle. Thosewho think that there is a ‘middle ground’ between
P  Q and P  ¬Q typically think that this ‘middle ground’ is occupied by so-
called “might’ counterfactuals’—propositions expressed by sentences of the form ‘if
it were the case that P , it might have been the case that Q’.12 And, on this view, the
negation of (B2) commits us to (D2), which doesn’t seem much better than (C2).
(D2) If you hadn’t chosen a, the initial conditions might have been changed.
If we accept (D2) and similar counterfactuals, we will say that ‘might’ counterfactuals
regularly backtrack. But these backtracking ‘might’ counterfactuals seem false for the
same reason that the backtracking ‘would’ counterfactuals seem false: it seems that we
do not have any causal influence over the initial conditions. And so it seems that, had
you not chosen a, the initial conditions would not have been any different; it’s not the
case that they might have been changed, had you chosen differently.
Lewis (1979) denies (B1).13 Not only does he deny (B1), he accepts (C1):
(C1) If you hadn’t chosen a, there would have been a miracle.
10. For Dorr’s distinction between “standard” and “non-standard” counterfactuals, see p. 245. Similar positions
are defended by Bennett (1984), Nute (1980, §5.3), Goggans (1992), Albert (2003), Kutach (2002), Loewer
(2007), Wilson (2014), and Goodman (2015), among others.
11. See, e.g., Stalnaker (1980) and DeRose (1999).
12. Defenders of cem say that these ‘might’ counterfactuals are just epistemic modals scoping over ordinary
‘would’ counterfactuals. That is, the logical form of ‘if it were the case that P , it might have been the case
thatQ’ is^e(PQ), where ‘^e ’ is an epistemic possibility operator.
13. Similar positions are defended by Jackson (1977), Halpin (1991), Lange (2000), Beebee (2003), and Kment
(2006), among others.
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To accept (C1) is to say that your choosing differently would have been a miraculous,
inexplicable event. It is to say that, had you chosen to not read this paper, that choice
would have had profound implications for our best theories of fundamental physics.
(Lewis also says that causal counterfactuals generally backtrack, though he thinks the
backtracking is limited to the very recent past; Lewisian counterfactuals don’t back-
track all the way to the initial conditions.)
Again, if we reject cem, we could reject (B1) without accepting (C1). However, if
we think that the ‘middle ground’ between P  Q and P  ¬Q is occupied by a
‘might’-counterfactual, then we will still end up accepting (D1), which doesn’t seem
much better than (C1):
(D1) If you hadn’t chosen a, there might have been a miracle.
A miraculous ‘might’ counterfactual like (D1) appears false for the same reasons that
a miraculous ‘would’ counterfactual like (C1) appears false: whether you choose a or
not doesn’t appear to have any causal influence over whether the laws of nature are
violated. Just as it seems incorrect to say that our best fundamental physical theories
would have been false, had you chosen differently, it also seems incorrect to say that
they might have been false, had you chosen differently.
So long as we adhere to the principle (B4), we are forced to deny one of (B1), (B2),
and (B3). This is puzzling in part because each of (B1), (B2), and (B3) appears true
when they are given a causal reading. So there’s a puzzle for the semantics of English
language counterfactuals. But there are additional puzzles for those of us who want to
use causal counterfactuals in our philosophical theorising—whether or not we tether
those counterfactuals to their English language counterparts. For instance, many of us
appeal to something like causal counterfactual conditionals in our theorising about ra-
tional choice. We may not be bothered if these theoretical tools end up differing from
the English conditionals which inspired them. But whatever we say about the connec-
tion between the English language and the causal counterfactuals used in philosophi-
cal theorising, so long as our theoretical tools satisfy (B4), we will have to deny one of
(B1), (B2), and (B3) when the claims are understood in our favoured theoretical sense.
And doing so will carry theoretical costs, quite apart from the counterintuitiveness of
denying one the English sentences (B1), (B2), or (B3).
1.3 Causal Decision Theory
Take, for instance, causal decision theory (CDT). Many formulations of CDT utilise
causal counterfactual conditionals.14 Just for illustrative purposes, take the version of
CDT from Gibbard & Harper (1978) and Stalnaker (1981). According to this theory,
you should choose whichever act would bring about the best outcome, in expectation.
That is, if O is the collection of potential outcomes, Pr your probability function, and
14. In addition to Gibbard & Harper (1978) and Stalnaker (1981), Lewis (1980) defines his causal dependency
hypotheses in terms of counterfactual independence, and the imaging functions from Sobel (1994) are ex-
plicated in terms of counterfactual conditionals.
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D(o) the desirability of the outcome o, then you should choose whichever option x




Pr(x o) · D(o)
In the discussion below, I’ll appeal to a helpful fact about utility. To appreciate this fact,
first define U (x | y) to be the utility that x has, conditional on you choosing y:
U (x | y) def=
∑
o∈O
Pr(x o | y) · D(o)
Here’s the fact: in a choice between two options, a and b, if bothU (b | a) > U (a | a) and
U (b | b) > U (a | b)—that is: if the utility of b exceeds the utility of a, conditional on
both a and b—then the unconditional utility of b will exceed the unconditional utility
of a, and so CDT will say that b is rational and a is irrational.15
Now, consider the following two decisions, adapted fromAhmed (2013, 2014a,b):16
Betting on a miracle You are certain that the laws are deterministic, and that there
are not and will never be any miracles. You are given a choice between two bets.
Bet a pays out $10 if there’s no miracle and $0 if there is. Bet b pays out $1 if
there’s no miracle and $11 if there is.
There’s no miracle There’s a miracle
Bet a $10 $0
Bet b $1 $11
Betting on the past You are certain that the laws are deterministic and that the initial
conditions were c. You are given a choice between two bets. Bet a pays out $10
if the initial conditions were c and $0 otherwise. Bet b pays out $1 if the initial
conditions were c and $11 otherwise.
Initial conditions are c Initial conditions are not c
Bet a $10 $0
Bet b $1 $11
It seems that, in both decisions, it is rational for you to take bet a and irrational for
you to take bet b. But, if we deny (B1), (B2), or (B3), then CDT will disagree. (By the
way, in the following, I will assume cem, so that denying (B1) commits us to (C1), and
15. To see this, first note that U (x) =
∑




yD(o)Pr(x  o | y) · Pr(y) =∑
y Pr(y) ·
∑
o Pr(x o | y) · D(o) =
∑
y Pr(y) · U (x | y). Therefore, unconditional utility U (x) is a linear
average of conditional utilities U (x | y), with weights given by your probability that you’ll select the op-
tions y. So if the conditional utility for b is greater than the conditional utility for a, given every option,
then the unconditional utility for b will exceed the unconditional utility for a, no matter what your option
probabilities are.
16. For additional discussion of decisions like these, see Solomon (2021) and Elga (ms).
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denying (B2) commits us to (C2). I make this assumption in the interests of simplicity;
similar troubles await even if we deny cem.)
Suppose first that we deny (B1) and accept (C1). Then, CDT will give apparently
bad advice in Betting on a miracle. There are two cases to consider. Either you take
a or you take b. If you take a, then you’re certain that, if you were to take a, there
wouldn’t be anymiracle, and you’d get $10.17 And, if youwere to take b, there would be
a miracle, and you would win $11. So Pr(a $10 | a) = Pr(b $11 | a) = 100%.
And so U (a | a) = D($10) and U (b | a) = D($11). Since $11 is more desirable than
$10, U (b | a) > U (a | a). On the other hand, suppose you take b. Then, were you to
take b, there wouldn’t be a miracle and you’d win $1. And, were you to take a, there
would be a miracle, and you’d win $0. So Pr(b $1 | b) = Pr(a $0 | b) = 100%.
And so U (a | b) = D($0) and U (b | b) = D($1). Since $1 is more desirable than $0,
U (b | b) > U (a | b). So b has a higher utility than a, whether you take a or b. So CDT
will say that b is rational and a is irrational. This looks like the wrong verdict.
Suppose on the other hand we deny (B2) and accept (C2). Then, CDT will give
apparently bad advice in Betting on the past. Suppose you take a. Then, you’ll expect
to get $10 from bet a, and you’ll expect that, were you to take b, you’d get $11 (since,
were you to take b, the initial conditions would be different). So we’ll again have that
Pr(a $10 | a) = Pr(b $11 | a) = 100%. So U (a | a) = D($10) and U (b | a) =
D($11). Suppose on the other hand you take b. Then, you’ll expect to get $1 from b,
and you’ll expect that, were you to take a, you’d get $0 (since, were you to take a, the
initial conditions would be different). So again: Pr(a $0 | b) = Pr(b $1 | b) =
100%, so U (a | b) = D($0) and U (b | b) = D($1). So b will have a higher utility than
a, whether you take a or b. So CDT will say that b is rational and a is irrational.
Denying (B3) only makes matters worse. If we deny (B3), then every choice will
always have exactly the same utility, and no option will ever be deemed irrational.
Some have responded to cases like these by proposing modifications to CDT.18
Others have suggested that Betting on a miracle and Betting on the past are not gen-
uine decisions,19 or that the kinds of situations in which you could plausibly face these
decisions are so outré that our judgements about rational choice in those decisions
are not trustworthy.20 From my perspective, it would be better to reject the causal
17. Here, I assume that, if you actually choose x, then were you to choose x, there wouldn’t be a miracle. We
could instead say that there are counterfactualmiracles evenwhen they aren’t needed tomake the antecedent
true. But saying this only makes matters worse for CDT, in the sense that it will only lower the utility of bet
a.
18. See, for instance, Sandgren & Williamson (2021), Williamson & Sandgren (forthcoming), and Kment (ms).
19. See Joyce (2016).
20. See, for instance, Dorr (2016, §7)’s discussion of decisions likeBetting on the past. It is also important to bear
inmind the observation from footnote 37 of Dorr (2016): given someways of presenting the proposition that
the initial conditions are c (e.g., “the initial conditions are what they actually are”), there is no possibility in
which bet a fails to pay out $10, and no possibility inwhich bet b pays outmore than $1. If the bet is presented
in these ways, then taking bet awill causally dominate taking bet b. I am assuming that it is possible for you
to be very confident that the initial conditions are c even under a “non-cheesy” guise, one which would pick
out a false proposition in nearby possible worlds where the initial conditions are different—though whether
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counterfactuals which lead CDT into trouble in these decisions. If we say that both
miracles and the past are counterfactually independent of your choice, then CDT will
advise you to take bet a in both decisions.
∗ ∗ ∗
Each of (B1), (B2), and (B3) are very natural. Given that we are careful to understand
them as causal counterfactuals, their negations appear false. If we must deny one of
(B1), (B2), and (B3), then there are serious challenges to causal decision theory. Since
I am inclined to accept a broadly causalist theory of rational choice,21 I would prefer
a semantics for causal counterfactuals which denies (B4). I provide a semantics like
this in Gallow (2016). In §§2 and 3 below, I will introduce and motivate this seman-
tics. Then, in §4, I will show that the semantics allows us to accept (B1) and (B2)—it
will obviously satisfy (B3). Finally, in §5, I will explain why the semantics violates the
schematic principle (B4), and discuss what the theory has to say about counterfactuals
like “If you hadn’t chosen a, then it would have been the case that either there was a
miracle or the initial conditions were different”.
2 Causal Influence and Causal Counterfactuals
In my view, causal counterfactuals presuppose a system of causal influence. After all,
what makes a counterfactual causal is that it holds fixed factors which are not causally
influenced by the antecedent. It only allows to swing free those factors which are
causally downstream of the antecedent. So, before we evaluate a causal counterfac-
tual, we must understand how the antecedent fits into the world’s causal structure:
what influences it, and what it influences.
The reason I will accept the counterfactual (B1) is that I will deny that there is any
causal influence running from whether you choose a to whether there is a miracle.
Likewise, I will accept (B2) because I will deny that there is any causal influence run-
ning from whether you choose a to whether the initial conditions are different.
2.1 Causal Influence
Causal influence is a relation which holds between variables. Variables are the con-
trastive generalisation of events. For illustration, let us begin with the Lewisian view
that events are properties of spacetime regions, or spacetime regions taken in inten-
sion. That is, a Lewisian event, e, is a class of possible spacetime regions. Spacetime
regions belonging to the class are regions in which the event occurs; those not belong-
ing to the class are regions in which it does not occur.22 Corresponding to this class is a
function from spacetime regions at possible worlds to {1,∗}, where ‘∗’ is some arbitrary
it could be rational for you to be certain of the proposition under this guise is another question entirely, and
one on which I needn’t take a stand.
21. See Gallow (2020, 2021)
22. See Lewis (1986a)
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entity. If this function maps a region, R, to 1, thenR is a region in which e occurs. If it
maps R to ∗, then R is not a region in which e occurs. (The choice of both ‘1’ and ‘∗’ is
arbitrary. Any other choice would do just as well. What’s important is how we divide
up the possible spacetime regions—which we include and which we exclude—and not
how we designate the included and the excluded.) Now, a variable, V , is a contrastive
property of a spacetime region. Taking the Lewisian view as our point of departure,
we may say that a variable is a class of classes of possible spacetime regions. Spacetime
regions belonging to one of the classes are regions in which the variable takes on a
value; those not belonging to any of the classes are regions in which it does not take on
a value. Spacetime regions which belong to the same class are alike with respect to the
variable property V . Corresponding to this class of classes is a function from possible
spacetime regions to R ∪ {∗}. If this function maps a region, R, to a real number v,
then the variable takes on a value in the region R, and that value is v. If the function
maps R to ∗, then the variable does not take on a value in the region R. (Our choice of
real numbers from R is arbitrary. What’s important is how we divide up the possible
spacetime regions, and not how we designate the cells of the division.)
Whereas events correspond to English expressions like “my throwing the ball”,
“the dinner”, and “the game’s end”, variables correspond to expressions like “whether I
throw the ball”, “howmuch I eat at dinner”, and “when the game ends”. When variables
causally influence each other, this is naturally expressed in English with the verb “af-
fects”. For instance: “whether I throw the ball affects when the game ends”, and “how
much I eat at dinner affects whether I throw the ball”.
When we build a mathematical model of a system of causal influence, we will in-
troduce names for variables and specify their possible values. Just as we distinguish
numbers from numerals, so too should we distinguish the causal relata—variables—
from theirmathematical representation—variable names. The variablewhether I throw
the ball is a class of classes of spacetime regions. But we can denote this variable with
a label—for instance, ‘B’. ‘B’ is a variable name. We could say that the possible values
for the variable name ‘B’ are 0 and 1, with B = 0 corresponding to me not throwing
the ball and B = 1 corresponding to me throwing the ball. Within the mathematical
model, ‘B = ∗’ will not be a well-formed expression. That’s because the mathematical
model will presuppose that all of the variables of interest take on some value or other.
A signature, S , gives us a name for every variable and specifies what its possible values
are. It additionally tells us which variables are exogenous andwhich are endogenous (a
distinction I will introduce below). Formally, a signature S is a triple (U ,V ,R), where
U is a set of exogenous variable names, V a set of endogenous variable names, andR
is a function from the variable names in U ∪ V to their potential values. (From here
on out, I won’t bother explicitly distinguishing variables from variable names. When
I am talking about the labels in a mathematical model, I mean ‘variable name’; when I
am talking about the causal relata out in the world, I mean ‘variable’.)
Relations of causal influence can be represented with a system of structural equa-
tions. For instance, suppose that you offer me a bet on whether a flipped coin will land
heads. If I bet and the coin lands heads, then I get $1. If I bet and the coin lands tails,
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then I lose $1. If I don’t bet, then I get nothing. Let ‘B’ represent the variable whether I
bet. Say that B takes on the value 1 if I take the bet and it takes on the value 0 if I reject
the bet. Likewise, let ‘H ’ represent the variable whether the coin lands heads. It is 1 if
the coin lands heads and −1 if it lands tails. And let ‘W ’ name the variable howmuch I
win. It is 1 if I win $1, −1 if I lose $1, and 0 if I neither win nor lose. Then, the following
system of structural equations tells me that how much I win is causally influenced both
by whether I bet and by whether the coin lands heads.
W := B ·H
This system of equations doesn’t just tell me thatW is causally influenced by B andH .
It additionally tells me how B and H causally influenceW . If B = 0, then B causally
determines that W = 0. If B = 1 and H = 1, then B and H causally determine that
W = 1. And if B = 1 andH = −1, then B andH causally determine thatW = −1.
A structural equation is asymmetric. B and H causally influenceW , butW does
not causally influence either B or H . Given the system of equations W := B ·H , we
may produce the following directed graph to illustrate the pathways along which the
variables causally influence each other.
I said thatW := B ·H is a system of structural equations. It is a systemwith a single
equation. We should distinguish the system of structural equationsW := B ·H from
the structural equationW := B ·H . The latter could appear in the following system of
structural equations:
W := B ·H
H := B
Whereas the system of structural equationsW := B·H tells us thatB andH are causally
independent—neither causally influences the other—the structural equationW := B ·
H does not. It is consistent with B causally influencing H , H causally influencing B,
or neither causally influencing the other. A system of equations effectively includes a
that’s all clause, telling us that the relations of causal influence the system describes are
the only relations of causal influence which obtain between the variables it includes.23
23. In some applications, we may want to impose a stronger requirement on a system of structural equations:
that the variables are closed under common causal influence. That is: for all variablesX,Y ,Z : ifX and Y are
in the system and Z causally influences both X and Y , then Z is also included in the system. (This closure
condition is often called causally sufficiency—see Spirtes et al. (2000) and Hausman & Woodward (1999),
for instance.) Common causes could make a difference to the evaluation of backtracking counterfactuals,
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In a system of structural equations, the variables which appear on the left-hand-
side of an equation are called endogenous, and the ones which do not are called exoge-
nous. Whether a variable is endogenous or exogenous is a property of whichmodel we
are looking at, and not the variable itself. I’ll denote the set of exogenous variables in a
model with ‘U ’, and the set of endogenous variables in the model with ‘V ’. Because the
equations are deterministic, once we know which values the exogenous variables take
on, we knowwhich values every variable in themodel takes on. So amodel of a system
of causal influence need only tell us which values each of the exogenous variables take
on. We can specify which values the exogenous variables take on with an assignment
of values to the exogenous variables in U .
In general, given a set of variables V, an assignment of values, v, to the variables
in V is a—perhaps partial—function from the variables V ∈V to the values inR(V ).
Since the function v need not be total, it need not assign a value to every variable in
V. If v is an assignment of values to V, then I’ll write ‘V = v’ for the claim that, for
every V ∈V in the domain of v, V = v(V ). That is, ‘V = v’ says that, for each variable
V ∈ V to which v assigns a value, V takes on the value which v assigns it. I’ll call a
total assignment of values to the exogenous variables in U an exogenous assignment.
What I will here call a causal model, M, is a triple containing a signature, S , a
system of structural equations, E , and an exogenous assignment, u. Or, equivalently, a
causal model is a 5-tuple of a set of exogenous variables, a set of endogenous variables,
a specification of the variables’ potential values, a system of structural equations, and
an exogenous assignment,M = (U ,V ,R,E ,u).
A causal model represents a system of causal influence. Ideally, we would want to
be able to model non-deterministic systems of causal influence. This would require
more complicated causal models, but it would not affect anything I have to say here
about the causal influence between your choice, the laws, and the distant past. So
I’ll stick to the deterministic case in the interests of simplicity. In the deterministic
case, causal influence between variables goes along with causal determination between
variable values. Thus, according to the structural equation Y := ϕ(X), the variable X
causally influences the variable Y , and a variable value X = x causally determines the
variable value Y = ϕ(x).
2.2 Causal Counterfactuals
Because a causal model contains an exogenous assignment and a system of structural
equations, it tells us which value every variable in themodel takes on. If the variableV
takes on the value v in the modelM, then we may write ‘M |= V = v’, and say thatM
validates the formula ‘V = v’. This definition of validationmay be extended to Boolean
combinations of variable values in the usual way.
but they won’t make any difference to the evaluation of causal counterfactuals. So I won’t be assuming causal
sufficiency here.
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Because causal models explicitly represent systems of causal influence, we can ad-
ditionally say whether a model validates a causal counterfactual conditional. Suppose
we have an antecedent variable, A, and a consequent variable C. And we wish to know
whether, were A to take on the value a, C would take on the value c, A = a C = c.
In a causal counterfactual, we hold fixed factors which are not causally downstream of
the antecedent, and we allow to swing free factors which are causally downstream of
the antecedent. Within a causal model, we can achieve this by removingA’s structural
equation, effectively severing any causal influence between A and its causal parents,
PA(A), and ‘exogenising’ the variable A. Then, we may solve for the values of the
other variables in the model as before. If it turns out that C = c in this minimally
altered model, then the counterfactual A = a C = c was validated by the original
model.
More carefully, given a causal modelM = (U ,V ,R,E ,u), let us define the mini-
mally altered model in which A takes on the value a,M[A→ a], as follows. If A = a,
thenM[A→ a] is justM itself.24 If A , a and A is exogenous, thenM[A→ a] is
justM, with the exogenous assignment u altered to assign the value a to A. The most
interesting case is when A , a and A is endogenous (though this case won’t actually
be relevant to our discussion here). If A is endogenous and A , a, thenM[A→ a] is
the model you get by moving A from the endogenous to the exogenous variable set,
removing A’s structural equation (the one with A on the left-hand-side) from the sys-
tem of equations, and adding A = a to the exogenous assignment. Iff the minimally
altered modelM[A→ a] validates ‘C = c’, the original modelM validates the causal
counterfactual ‘A = a C = c’.
(→M) M |= A = a C = c ⇐⇒ M[A→ a] |= C = c
For illustration, consider the following causal model, which we can call ‘Mcoin’:
B = 0
H = 1
W := B ·H
This model contains the exogenous variable set U = {B,H}, and the endogenous vari-
able set V = {W }. The range of B, R(B), is {1,0}. The range of H , R(H) = {1,−1}.
And the range ofW ,R(W ) = {−1,0,1}. It contains the system of structural equations
E = {W := B ·H}. And the exogenous assignment maps B to 0 and H to 1. InMcoin,
the causal counterfactual ‘B = 1W = 1’ (‘had you taken the bet, you would have
24. Without this clause, causal counterfactuals will not satisfy modus ponens. See Briggs (2012).
12 of 31
§2 causal influence and causal counterfactuals
won’) is true. For consider the minimally altered modelMcoin[B→ 1]:
B = 1
H = 1
W := B ·H
In this model, the consequent ‘W = 1’ is true. The reason this counterfactual comes
out true is that there is no causal influence from B to H . So, when we consider what
would have happened, had you taken the bet, we hold fixed the actual value ofH .
Or considerMmiracle, which models the decision you face in Betting on amiracle.
Thismodel contains the variableA, for which bet you choose. If you choose bet a, then
A = 1. If you choose bet b, then A = 0. It also contains a variable, M , for whether
there is a miracle. If there is a miracle, thenM = 1; and if there is not, thenM = 0.
Finally, there is a variable,W , for how much money you win. W can take on any value
in {0,1,10,11}, and its value is equal to the number of dollars you win. Suppose you
actually take bet a, and there is no miracle.
A = 1
M = 0
W := 10 ·A ·M +11 ·A ·M +A ·M
(In this structural equation, ‘X’ is the function 1−X.) InMmiracle, the causal counter-
factualA = 0M = 0 (‘had you not chosen a, there would not have been amiracle’)
is true. For, in the minimally altered modelMmiracle[A→ 0], the value ofM remains
0. The reason the counterfactual comes out true inMmiracle is that there’s no causal
influence between A and M . So, when we consider what would have happened, had
you not chosen a, we hold fixed whether there was a miracle.
Finally, considerMpast , whichmodels the decision you face inBetting on the Past.
LikeMmiracle, this model contains the variablesA andW , with the same values and the
same interpretations. It also contains the variableC, for whether the initial conditions
are c. If the initial conditions are c, then C = 1; and if they are not c, then C = 0.
Suppose you actually take the bet a, and the initial conditions are c.
A = 1
C = 1
W := 10 ·A ·C +11 ·A ·C +A ·C
In Mpast , the counterfactual A = 0  C = 1 (‘had you not chosen a, the initial
conditionswould have been c’) is true. For, in theminimally alteredmodelMpast[A→
0], the value of C remains 1. The reason the counterfactual comes out true inMpast is
that there’s no causal influence between A and C. So, when we consider what would
have happened, had you not chosen a, we hold fixed the initial conditions.
13 of 31
causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
It is one thing to write down these causal models and show that they validate the
counterfactuals (B1) and (B2). It is another thing to show that these are the correct
models to be using to evaluate the counterfactuals. Take any counterfactual youwish—
‘had I not cut my toenails on November 8th, 2016, Trump wouldn’t have won’, for in-
stance. It’s completely trivial to write down a causal model according to which this
counterfactual is true. Just use the variable C, for whether I cut my toenails, and T ,
for whether Trump wins, and include the structural equation T := C. Simply writ-
ing down this model isn’t enough to show that whether Trump won counterfactu-
ally depends upon whether I cut my toenails. And likewise, writing down the models
Mmiracle andMpast above isn’t enough to show that the counterfactuals (B1) and (B2)
are true. We could after all just as easily have written down models according to which
whether you choose a causally influences whether there’s a miracle or whether the
initial conditions are c.
(→M) tells uswhat it is for amodel to validate a causal counterfactual conditional.
On its own, that does not tell us what it is for a causal counterfactual conditional to
be true or false. I will take it for granted here that a causal counterfactual conditional
is true if it is validated by a causal model which adequately represents the relations of
causal influence out in the world—or, for the sake of brevity: the conditional is true
if it is validated by a correct causal model. Likewise, the counterfactual is false if its
negation is validated by a correct causal model. (If there is no causal model which
validates either the counterfactual or its negation, then I say nothing about whether
the counterfactual is true or false.)
(→) ∃M :M is correct ∧M[A→ a] |= C = c ⇒ A = a C = c
∃M :M is correct ∧M[A→ a] |= C , c ⇒ A = a ̸→ C = c
Then, if the modelsMmiracle andMpast are going to offer a satisfying resolution of the
puzzle from §1.2, we must be told something general about when a causal model is
correct. And we must be given reason to think that the modelsMmiracle andMpast are
correct. This is the task I will take up in §§3 and 4 below. In §3, I will sketch a theory of
causal influence—a theory of when a causal model is correct. In §4, I will explain how
this theory tells us that, in the relevant decisions,Mmiracle andMpast correctly describe
the causal influence your choices have over whether there’s a miracle and whether the
initial conditions are c, respectively.
3 ATheory of Causal Influence
Standard semantics for counterfactuals utilise a selection function on a space of possible
worlds. In this framework, each proposition is taken to be a set of possible worlds, a
proposition is true at a world iff the world is contained within the proposition, and one
proposition, A, entails another, B, iff A ⊆ B. A selection function, s, is a function from
a proposition,A, and a possible world,w, to a proposition, s(A,w). The interpretation
is that, from the perspective of world w, s(A,w) is the strongest proposition which
would have been true, hadA been true. The standard semantics then say thatA C
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is true at a world w iff s(A,w) entails C.25
(→s) w ∈ A C ⇐⇒ s(A,w) ⊆ C
For causal counterfactuals, I reject (→s). In its place, I accept (→). But I will
nonetheless utilise the framework of the standard semantics to saywhen a causalmodel
correctly represents a system of causal influence. That is: I will appeal to a space of pos-
sible worlds and a selection function to explain what it takes for a causal model to be
correct.
For illustration, consider two variables,X andY , with two possible values, 1 and 0.
Then, propositions like X = 0 and Y = 1 will correspond to sets of possible worlds—
the set of possible worlds in which those variables take on those values.26 Now, con-
sider the structural equationY := X. I will say that, if this structural equation is correct
at w, then
s(X = 0,w) ⊆ Y = 0 and s(X = 1,w) ⊆ Y = 1
Think of s(A,w) as a set of A-worlds which are not too different from w. Then, I will
say that, at w, X causally influences Y in the way described by the equation Y := X
only if (a) the set of X = 0 worlds which are not too different from w are all worlds
at which Y = 0; and (b) the set of X = 1 worlds which are not too different from w
are all worlds at which Y = 1. (When I say that the worlds are “not too different”,
I mean to appeal to your intuitive standards of similarity, applied to the time of the
antecedent. Of course, minor differences at one time can balloon into large differences
at a later time. This famously led to trouble for Lewis’s interpretation of s(A,w) as the
set of A-worlds not too different from w tout court.27 Lewis attempted to deal with
the problem by introducing stipulative standards of similarity, but his attempts were
not successful.28 From my perspective, it is better to rely on our intuitive standards of
similarity, but restrict the kinds of similarities which matter. Differences at the time
of the antecedent are relevant, but even large differences at other times are not. There
is more to be said here, but fortunately, not much will hang upon the particulars of
how we understand the selection function. Whenever the details become relevant, I’ll
explicitly discuss them.)
Below, I will say something slightly more general about the relationship between
a causal model and a selection function. In §4, I will use this general theory of causal
influence to explain why the causal modelsMmiracle andMpast from §2 are correct.
25. See Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). My presentation here rejects Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption, but
accepts his limit assumption.
26. I assume that, necessarily, a variable takes on a value in at most one spacetime region. Thus, for instance,
X = 0∩X = 1 = ∅.
27. See Lewis (1973), Bennett (1974), Fine (1975), Lewis (1979), and Bennett (2003, §75).
28. See, for instance, Elga (2001) and Wasserman (2006).
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Because thesemodels contain only a single structural equation, I’ll focus on this special
case here. A more general treatment can be found in Gallow (2016).
Take a causal model containing the system of equations E = {V := ϕ(PA(V ))}.
(By the way, PA(V ) are V ’s causal parents—the variables which appear on the right-
hand-side ofV ’s structural equation—and ‘ϕ(PA(V ))’ is some function of all and only
the variables in PA(V ).) In order for this causal model to be correct, all of the vari-
ables appearing inPA(V )∪{V }must bemereologically distinct; theymust not overlap.
This distinctness requirement is an important component of most theories of causa-
tion. For instance, take a counterfactual theory of causation (a CTC), and consider
the events John’s playing cards and John’s playing poker. If John hadn’t played cards, he
wouldn’t have played poker. We should not conclude that John’s playing cards caused
him to play poker. The connection between John’s playing poker and his playing cards
is constitutive, not causal. For this reason, careful CTCs stipulate that counterfactual
dependence reveals causation only when the two events are mereologically distinct.29
And for similar reasons, we should not allow a causal model to include variables which
overlap. The mereology of variables is another topic for another occasion. But let
me offer the following necessary (but insufficient) condition on all of the variables in
PA(V ) ∪ {V } being distinct: every assignment of values to these variables must be
metaphysically possible. That is: for every assignment of values to the variables in
PA(V )∪ {V }, it must be possible that those variables take on those values. This is the
condition which Woodward (2015) calls independent fixability.30
In addition, if the system of equations {V := ϕ(PA(V ))} is going to be correct, then
the variables inPA(V ) should causally influenceV in themanner described byϕ. And
I will say that this is so iff, in all of the not too different possibilities in which we wiggle
the values of the ‘parent’ variables, PA(V ), the equality V = ϕ(PA(V )) continues to
hold. That is: if the system {V := ϕ(PA(V ))} is correct at w, then the following must
be true, for every assignment of values, pa, to the variables in PA(V ):
s(PA(V ) = pa,w) ⊆ V = ϕ(PA(V ))
That is: to checkwhetherV := ϕ(PA(V )) is correct atw, you have to take every assign-
ment of values to PA(V ) and consider every world not too different from w in which
that assignment is realised. For each such world, you must check that the value of V
at that world equals the value to whichϕmaps the values of PA(V ) at that world. This
imposes a kind of stability requirement on the system of equations {V := ϕ(PA(V ))}.
The equation V := ϕ(PA(V )) must not only be actually true; it must also be that it
remains true, no matter how we wiggle the values of the parent variables in PA(V ).
As I emphasised in §2 above, the system of equations {V := ϕ(PA(V ))} doesn’t
just say that each P ∈ PA(V ) causally influences V . It also says that none of the P ∈
PA(V ) are causally influenced by any other variables in the model. Suppose that, for
29. See the discussion in Lewis (1986a,b).
30. For further discussion of the mereology of variables, see Hoffmann-Kolss (2021).
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some ‘parent’ variable P ∈ PA(V ), there is a set of variables, Q, which includes at
least one other variable from the model—i.e., Q∩ (PA(V ) \ {P }) , ∅—such that the
variables in Q causally influence P . If that’s so, then the system of equations {V :=
ϕ(PA(V ))} is not correct. For, if that’s so, then there is causal influence between some
of the variables in themodel, but themodel does not tell us about that causal influence.
Some collection of variables Q causally influences P iff there’s some function ψ such
that, in all of the not too different possibilities in which we wiggle the values ofQ, the
equation P = ψ(Q) continues to hold. So, if the system of equations {V := ϕ(PA(V ))}
is going to be correct, then there cannot be a set of variables Q and a function ψ like
that. (Of course, not just any function ψ is enough to reveal genuine causal influence.
If ψ is a constant function of Q, this doesn’t reveal any influence that Q has on P . In
general, I think we should require that ψ be both a surjective function and a function
of every variableQ ∈Q. For instance, the function ψ(X) = 1 does not count, since it
is not surjective, andψ(X,Y ) = X+(Y −Y ) does not count, since it is not a function of
Y . Of course, all the same remarks apply to the function ϕ in the system of equations
{V := ϕ(PA(V ))}. It too must be a surjective function of all of the ‘parent’ variables in
PA(V ).)
Putting these three requirements together, we get:
Causal Influence The system of equations E = {V := ϕ(PA(V ))} is correct at a world
w iff
(E1) all of the variables in PA(V )∪ {V } are distinct;
(E2) for every assignment of values to PA(V ), pa,
s(PA(V ) = pa,w) ⊆ V = ϕ(PA(V ))
and
(E3) for every P ∈ PA(V ), there is no set Q containing variables from PA(V ) \
{P } such that (a) all of the variables inQ∪{P } are distinct, and (b) there’s a
surjective function ψ of the variables in Q such that, for every assignment
of values to Q, q,
s(Q = q,w) ⊆ P = ψ(Q)
Condition (E1) tells us that there are no (metaphysically) necessary connections be-
tween the variables’ values. Condition (E2) tells us that the variables in PA(V ) all
causally influence V in the way described by the function ϕ. And condition (E3) tells
us that none of the variables in PA(V ) causally influence each other.31,32
31. Condition (E3) is a stronger condition than I required in Gallow (2016). For reasons I don’t have the space
to discuss here, I’ve come to think that this additional strength is necessary.
32. In truth, I think this account is still a bit too rough. For example, it doesn’t adequately address the issue with
modularity I discuss in Gallow (2016). But these issues are orthogonal to my aims here, and so I’ve chosen
to ignore them.
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We can illustrate Causal Influence by showing how it can be used to vindicate the
causal modelMcoin in the decision described in §2 above.
B = 0
H = 1
W := B ·H
Causal Influence tells us that, in order forMcoin to be correct, the variables B,H, and
W must not overlap—in particular, they must be independently fixable. We must be
careful here. In particular, we must understand the variableW in such a way that you
winning $1 (W = 1) does not entail that you took the bet. That is: wemust understand
the variableW in such a way that you could win $1 without winning $1 off of this very
bet. In that case, every assignment of values to the variables will be metaphysically
possible. And, moreover, the variables in {B,H,W } will all be mereologically distinct.
So condition (E1) is satisfied.
Condition (E2) says that, in every not too different possibility in which one of the
assignments of values to {B,H} is realised, the value of W must be equal to B · H .
Because there are 8 possible assignments of values to {B,H}, this imposes 8 different
constraints. Assuming that, for any A, s(A,w) ⊆ A, condition (E2) requires each of
the following:
s(B = 0,w) ⊆W = 0 s(B = 1,w) ⊆W =H
s(H = −1,w) ⊆W = −B s(H = 1,w) ⊆W = B
s(B = 0∧H = −1,w) ⊆W = 0 s(B = 0∧H = 1,w) ⊆W = 0
s(B = 1∧H = −1,w) ⊆W = −1 s(B = 1∧H = 1,w) ⊆W = 1
(Here, w is the world we are modelling; it is the world in which you refuse the bet
and the coin lands heads.) Assuming that the betting arrangement remains intact at
any world not too different from w at which B and H are assigned these values, each
of these constraints should be satisfied. For illustration, take the first two constraints.
The first says: any possibility not too different fromw at which you refuse the bet must
be one at which you neither win nor lose any money. This constraint will be satisfied;
for, if you refuse the bet, then it won’t matter how the coin lands, you’ll neither gain
or lose any money. The second says: any possibility not too different from w at which
you take the bet must be one at which the value ofW is equal to the value of H . This
constraint, too, will be satisfied. Either the coin will land tails, H = −1, and you will
lose $1, or else the coin will land heads, H = 1, and you will win $1. Either way, the
value ofW will equal the value ofH .
Finally, condition (E3) requires that neither B nor H causally influence the other.
If we suppose that s(B = 1,w) contains both possibilities at which the coin lands heads
and possibilities at which the coin lands tails, then B will not on its own causally influ-
enceH . For s(B = 1,w) does entail thatH is any function of B—the value ofH varies
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while the value ofB is held fixed. SoH is not causally influenced byB. It is also natural
to suppose that both s(H = 1,w) and s(H = −1,w) contain only worlds at which you
(still) refuse the bet. Making the coin land heads or tails does not require us to change
anything about your preceding decision. If so, then B will not be causally influenced
by H . This doesn’t establish that B doesn’t causally influence H in concert with some
other variables, but no candidates spring to mind. There are of course variables which
causally influence whether the coin lands heads (the coin’s precise initial upward and
angular velocities, e.g.) but these variables causally influence whether the coin lands
heads on their own—we do not need the extra information of whether you took the
bet or not. So I will take it for granted that condition (E3) is satisfied, though I do not
pretend to have conclusively demonstrated this.
SoCausal Influence tells us that, in this decision,Mcoin is correct. Then, (→) tells
us that the causal counterfactual “had you taken the bet, you would have won” (B =
1W = 1) is true. This is noteworthy for three reasons. Firstly, the counterfactual
appears true. Secondly, counterfactuals like these have important theoretical roles to
play elsewhere. Suppose, for instance, that I talked you out of taking the bet. Then, it
seems that I prevented you from winning $1. If we accept a counterfactual theory of
causation, then we’ll want the causal counterfactual “had I not talked you out of taking
the bet, you would have won $1” to be true.33,34 Thirdly, holding fixed our assumptions
about the selection function, the semantics (→s) will tell us that B = 1 W = 1
is false. For we assumed that s(B = 1,w) contains both worlds where the coin lands
heads (and, therefore, you win) and worlds where the coin lands tails (and, therefore,
you lose). Then, s(B = 1,w) * W = 1, so according to (→s), B = 1 ̸ W = 1.35
Of course, we could always reject one of our assumptions about the selection function.
Standard ways of doing this require us to characterise the selection function in terms
of causal influence.36 If we were to then characterise causal influence in terms of the
selection function, our theory would be circular—not viciously circular, in my view,
but circular nonetheless.
A non-circular theory of causal counterfactuals would be preferable, other things
being equal. For a non-circular theory allows us to explain things which a circular
theory does not. For instance, it allows us to explain why the outcome of the coin flip
is not causally influenced by whether you take the bet. So I take it to be a benefit of the
theory I’ve sketched here that—without any assumptions about causal influence—it
predicts that the causal counterfactual “had you taken the bet, you would have won” is
true. This prediction gives us some reason to accept the theory, quite independent of
33. The truth of a counterfactual like this isn’t in general needed for the corresponding claim about prevention
to be true. It could be, for instance, that, had I not talked you out of the bet, someone else would have. But
if there’s no funny business like that going on, then we should expect the truth of the prevention claim to go
along with the truth of the causal counterfactual claim.
34. For another theoretical role which causal counterfactuals like this have to play, see Gallow (ms, §5).
35. Sidney Morgenbesser raised this as an objection to (→s). See Slote (1978).
36. See, for instance, the proposals in Bennett (2003, ch. 15), Edgington (2004), Schaffer (2004), and Kment
(2006).
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the fact that it vindicates both (B1) and (B2).
4 Causal Counterfactuals without Miracles or Backtracking
In this section, I will explain how the theory adumbrated in §3 above can be used to
show thatMmiracle andMpast are correct in the relevant decisions. This will show that,
in those decisions, the causal counterfactuals ‘had you not chosen a, there wouldn’t
have been a miracle’ (B1) and ‘had you not chosen a, the initial conditions would have
been c’ (B2) are both true.
In order to get the result thatMmiracle andMpast are correct, I will have to assume
a bit more about the selection function. I’ll explain this additional assumption in §4.1.
Then, in §4.2, I will explain why the modelsMmiracle andMpast are correct.
4.1 Against Strong Centring
I assume that the selection function satisfies some standard structural principles like:
1) for all A, s(A,w) ⊆ A; and 2) for all A,B, if A ⊆ B then s(B,w) ∩ A ⊆ s(A,w).
Importantly, however, I will deny that the selection function satisfies the following
structural principle, known as strong centring.
Strong Centring If w ∈ A, then s(A,w) = {w}.
Strong centring says that, if A is already true at w, then w itself is the only world not
too different from w at which A is true. In other words: if it’s possible for A to be
true without things being any different than they are at w, then any difference from
w whatsoever is too different from w. Given the standard semantics, strong centring
corresponds to the principle of conjunction conditionalisation (CC), which allows you
to infer A C from A ∧ C.37 However, if we reject the standard semantics, there
needn’t be any relationship between strong centring and CC. Indeed, CC follows from
the causal-modelling semantics (→) which I provided in the previous section.38 So,
if we accept (→), there need not be any connection between strong centring and CC.
To appreciate why I do not want to impose strong centring, consider the variables
J and D , which represent whether Jesus of Nazareth is born and whether the Defen-
estration of Prague occurs, respectively. J = 1 if Jesus is born, and J = 0 if he is not
born. D = 1 if the Defenestration of Prague happens and D = 0 if it does not.39 And
consider the structural equation D := J . According to this equation,
(F1) Jesus not being born causally determines the Defenestration to not happen,
s(J = 0,w) ⊆D = 0
37. See Walters & Williams (2013) for an argument for conjunction conditionalisation.
38. Here, it is important that I definedM[A→ a] to beM itself, if A already takes on the value a inM. See
Briggs (2012).
39. It doesn’t matter, but I mean the second Defenestration of Prague, in 1618.
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and
(F2) Jesus being born causally determines the Defenestration to happen,
s(J = 1,w) ⊆D = 1
(I’m using ‘w’ for the actual world.) It appears that (F1) is true. After all, had Je-
sus never existed, neither would the Catholic Church have existed; and without the
Catholic Church, there would be no Protestant Reformation, nor the Bohemian reli-
gious disputes which precipitated the Defenestration of Prague. Any not too differ-
ent possible world in which Jesus is not born is a world too different for the Defen-
estration of Prague to occur. Now, if we were to accept strong centring, then (F2),
s(J = 1,w) ⊆ D = 1, would be automatic. For w itself is a world at which Jesus is
born. Strong centring then tells us that s(J = 1,w) = {w}. And since w is also a world
at which the Defenestration occurs, {w} ⊆ D = 1. But the structural equation D := J
appears false. Even if there is a convoluted chain of causal influence connecting these
two variables, the value of J is not directly causally sufficient for the value of D , in the
way that structural equation D := J requires.
While I accept (F1), I reject (F2). Since both (F1) and (F2) are needed for the struc-
tural equation D := J to be correct, I say that the equation is not correct. The reason
I reject (F2) is that I reject strong centring. Even though Jesus is actually born, the set
s(J = 1,w) is not a singleton containing w. Jesus could easily have been born in a va-
riety of different ways. In my view, each of these easy ways for Jesus to be born should
be included in the set s(J = 1,w). So, while w is a member of s(J = 1,w), it is not the
onlymember. The world is chaotic, andminor variations in themanner of Jesus’s birth
make for larger differences in the course of his life and the lives of those around him,
which lead to even larger differences in the course of human history hundreds of years
down the line. Had Jesus been born with a birthmark or a cleft palate, his childhood
and psychological development could easily have been have vastly different; he could
easily fail to become a religious leader, and even if he had become a religious leader,
the reception of his teachings could easily have been vastly different. Minor differ-
ences snowball quickly enough that many, many of these easy possibilities are ones in
which the Christian religion is never founded, or never adopted as a state religion by
Constantine. Due to the extreme sensitivity of genetics on initial conditions—minor
variations in the time and manner of copulation make for differences in which sperm
fertilises which egg—a great many of them are possibilities in which none of the peo-
ple who actually lived in the sixteenth century ever even existed. Without either a
Catholic Church or a Martin Luther, these are possibilities in which the Bohemian re-
ligious disputes which precipitated the Defenestration of Prague never happened. So
s(J = 1,w) *D = 1, and (F2) is false. So the structural equationD := J is not correct.
If we want to explain what it takes for a causal model to be correct in terms of
a selection function in the way I suggested in §3, then we have good reason to not
want our selection function s to satisfy strong centring. For we should not want to say
that all past historical events causally determine all events in the far enough future.
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So we should distinguish X’s value causally determining Y ’s from Y ’s value sensitively
depending upon X’s. And drawing this distinction requires us to attend to more than
a single possibility in which X takes on its actual value.
So I reject strong centring. However, I still accept weak centring, which says that,
if w is a world at which A is true, then w is among the A-worlds which are not too
different from w. That is: if w ∈ A, then w ∈ s(A,w). Weak centring will play an
important role in my discussion below.
4.2 Betting on a Miracle
Consider again the decision Betting on a miracle from §1.3. Recall: in this decision,
you must choose between two bets: a and b. Bet a pays out $10 if there’s not a miracle
and nothing if there is; bet b pays out $11 if there’s a miracle and $1 if there’s not. At the
actual world, w, you choose a and there’s no miracle. In §2.2, I modelled this decision
with the following system of equations.
A = 1
M = 0
W := 10 ·A ·M +11 ·A ·M +A ·M
According to Causal Influence, this system of equations is correct iff (E1) all of its
variables are distinct, (E2) in all of the not too different possibilities in which wewiggle
the values of A andM , the equationW = 10 ·A ·M +11 ·A ·M +A ·M continues to
hold, and (E3) neither A norM causally influence each other.
(E1) is satisfied. To appreciate this, notice that every assignment of values to the
variables in {A,M,W } is possible, so the variables are independently fixable.40 As with
the modelMcoin, we must exercise some caution here. In particular, we must under-
stand the variableW in such a way that you could win $1, $10, or $11 without winning
it off of this very bet. (Otherwise,W = 11 will metaphysically necessitate that A = 0.)
However, if we understandW in this way, then condition (E1) will be satisfied.
Condition (E2) will be satisfied so long as, in every not too different possibility in
which one of the assignments of values to {A,M} is realised, the value ofW continues
to be 10 ·A ·M+11 ·A ·M+A ·M . Because there are 8 assignments of values to {A,M},
this imposes 8 different constraints:
s(A = 0,w) ⊆W = 11 ·M +M s(A = 1,w) ⊆W = 10 ·M
s(M = 0,w) ⊆W = 10 ·A+A s(M = 1,w) ⊆W = 11 ·A
s(A = 0∧M = 0,w) ⊆W = 1 s(A = 0∧M = 1,w) ⊆W = 11
s(A = 1∧M = 0,w) ⊆W = 10 s(A = 1∧M = 1,w) ⊆W = 0
40. Independent fixability is not sufficient for the variables to be distinct, but these variables also satisfy any
stronger criteria we might reasonably want to impose.
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(Here, ‘w’ is the world at which you choose a and there’s no miracle.)
There are many choices to be made about the worlds returned by the selection
function. For instance, we could take the Lewisian route of saying that s(A,w) con-
tains worlds with the same past asw, in which a miracle occurs just before the time of
the antecedent. Or we could instead side with authors like Dorr and say that s(A,w)
contains worlds in which there is no miracle, and so the past is ever-so-slightly dif-
ferent at a microphysical level. Call the first understanding of the selection function
‘miraculous’, and call the second a ‘backtracking’ understanding. For our purposes, it
won’t matter whether we adopt a backtracking or a miraculous understanding of the
selection function.
So long as our betting arrangement remains intact at the not too different worlds at
which the variablesA andM are assigned these values, each of the eight constraints im-
posed by (E2) will be satisfied. For illustration, just take the first constraint. Amongst
the not too different worlds where I take bet b, how much I win varies as a function
of whether there’s a miracle. If we have a miraculous understanding of the selection
function, then all of the worlds in s(A = 0,w) will contain a miracle. If we have a
backtracking understanding, then none of them will. But, either way, the equality
W = 11 ·M +M will hold. For, in the miraculous worlds, I’ll win $11; and in the
non-miraculous worlds, I’ll win $1.
When we consider the other 7 constraints, we should guard against a potential
confusion. On a miraculous understanding of the selection function, s(A,w) gener-
ally takes us to worlds in which there’s been a miracle to bring about A. However, if
our antecedent explicitly stipulates that there is no miracle,M = 0, then the set of not
too different worlds in which there’s no miracle, s(M = 0,w), must not include any
miraculous worlds. If s(M = 0,w) contains worlds other than w itself—as I argued
it should in §4.1—then some of these worlds will be backtracking worlds at which the
past is ever-so-slightly different. For, given that the laws are actually deterministic,
every non-actual world is either a miraculous world or a backtracking world. And
antecedents which explicitly stipulate that there is no miracle will forbid us from con-
sidering the miraculous worlds. So, if we must consider some non-actual worlds, we
must consider some backtracking ones. This is consistent with the selection function
generally delivering miraculous worlds. Likewise, on a backtracking understanding
of the selection function, it generally takes us to worlds at which the past is ever-so-
slightly non-miraculous worlds. However, if our antecedent explicitly stipulates that
there is amiracle,M = 1, then the set of not too different worlds in which there’s amir-
acle must consist of miraculous worlds. This is consistent with the selection function
generally delivering non-miraculous worlds.
Condition (E3) requires that neither A norM causally influence the other. How-
ever, for our purposes here, the only relevant requirement is that A not causally influ-
enceM . The reason is that, even ifM causally influences A, the causal counterfactual
A = 0M = 0 (‘had you not taken a, there wouldn’t have been a miracle’) will still
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be true. That is, suppose that, in fact, a causal model like this one is correct:
M = 0
A :=M
W := 10 ·A ·M +11 ·A ·M +A ·M
If we begin with this model, then the minimally altered model in whichA takes on the
value 0 is shown below.
M = 0
A = 0
W := 10 ·A ·M +11 ·A ·M +A ·M
And this is precisely the same as the minimally altered model we get if we begin with
a model in which M does not causally influence A. Since M = 0 in this minimally
altered model, the causal counterfactualA = 0M = 0will be true, whether or not
M causally influences A.
Of course, if A causally influences M , this counterfactual needn’t be true. So let
us show that it does not. Again, it won’t matter whether we have a miraculous un-
derstanding of the selection function or a backtracking understanding. Start with the
miraculous understanding and suppose—for reductio—that there’s some set of vari-
ables, Q, which includes A and which is such that, for some surjective function, ψ, of
the variables in Q, the equalityM = ψ(Q) is true in all of the not too different worlds
in which we wiggle the values of some of the variables in Q. That is: suppose that,
for every assignment of values q to Q, s(Q = q,w) ⊆ M = ψ(Q). Consider the ac-
tual assignment of values, qw. By weak centring, s(Q = qw,w) contains w. And by
stipulation, at w, there is no miracle, M = 0. So we have that ψ(qw) = 0. But since
s(Q = qw,w) must contain some non-actual worlds (as I argued in §4.1), it must also
contain some worlds at which there is a miracle (given the miraculous understand-
ing of the selection function). So we have that ψ(qw) = 1. Contradiction. So if we
adopt a miraculous understanding of the selection function, then there is no variable
set containing A which causally influencesM .
Next, take a backtracking understanding of the selection function. Suppose—for
reductio—that there’s a set of variables, Q which contains A and is such that Q∪ {M}
are all distinct. Also suppose that there’s a function ψ such thatM = ψ(Q) is true in
all of the not too different possibilities in which the values ofQ are wiggled. Since the
selection function backtracks, s(Q = q,w)will only containmiracles if the assignment
Q = q requires them. But if the assignment Q = q metaphysically necessitates that
M = 1, thenQ andM will not be independently fixable, and the variables inQ∪{M}
will not be distinct. Since, by hypothesis, the variables are distinct, none of the worlds
in s(Q = q,w) will contain miracles—for any assignment q. So s(Q = q,w) ⊆M = 0
for every assignment q. But then,ψ(q) = 0 for every assignment q. Soψ is a constant,
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not a surjective, function. Contradiction. So if we adopt a backtracking understanding
of the selection function, then there is no variable set containing A which causally
influencesM .
Either way, then, A does not causally influence M . Assuming that M doesn’t
causally influence A—though, to reiterate, it doesn’t ultimately matter whether this
is so—condition (E3) is satisfied. So the modelMmiracle is correct. And so, given the
semantics (→), the causal counterfactual ‘if you hadn’t chosen a, there wouldn’t have
been a miracle’ (B1) is true.
4.3 Betting on the Past
Recall the decision Betting on the past from §1.3. You must choose between bet a and
bet b. Bet a pays out $10 if the initial conditions are c and nothing if they’re not. And
Bet b pays out $1 if the initial conditions are c and $11 if they’re not. In fact, the initial




W := 10 ·A ·C +11 ·A ·C +A ·C
Causal Influence tells us that this system of equations is correct iff (E1) all of its vari-
ables are distinct, (E2) in all of the not too different worlds where the values of A and
C are wiggled, the equationW = 10 ·A ·C +11 ·A ·C +A ·C is true, and (E3) neither
A nor C causally influence the other.
Bearing in mind the caveat about the interpretation of the variable W from §4.2
above, condition (E1) will be satisfied. Condition (E2) imposes the following 8 con-
straints:
s(A = 0,w) ⊆W = 11 ·C +C s(A = 1,w) ⊆W = 10 ·C
s(C = 0,w) ⊆W = 11 ·A s(C = 1,w) ⊆W = 10 ·A+A
s(A = 0∧C = 0,w) ⊆W = 11 s(A = 0∧C = 1,w) ⊆W = 1
s(A = 1∧C = 0,w) ⊆W = 0 s(A = 1∧C = 1,w) ⊆W = 10
(Here, ‘w’ is the actual world, at which you choose a and the initial conditions are c.) So
long as our betting arrangement remains intact at the not too different worlds at which
the variablesA andC are assigned these values, these 8 constraints should be satisfied,
whether we have a miraculous or a backtracking understanding of the selection func-
tion. While it won’t matter whether we think about the ‘not too different’ possibilities
in terms of tiny miracles or in terms of minor changes to the past, it will matter very
much which changes to the initial conditions we regard as not too different. Some
ways of changing the initial conditions lead to large-scale macroscopic differences in
the world at the time when you are offered the bet in the actual world. Other lead to
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minor, microscopic differences which only manifest in macroscopic differences after
you are offered the bet. In the former kinds of possibilities, you may not be offered the
bet at all, and the variableAmay not take on a value. In the latter kinds of possibilities,
the terms of the bet will remain the same, and the variablesA andW will both take on
values. I will take it for granted here that s(C = 0,w) only contains the latter kinds of
possibilities. And I’ll assume likewise for s(C = 1,w), s(A = C = 0,w), and so on.
Condition (E3) requires that neither A nor C causally influence the other. How-
ever, just as in Betting on a miracle, it won’t ultimately matter if C causally influences
A. Even if a system of equations like this is correct,
C = 1
A = C
W := 10 ·A ·C +11 ·A ·C +A ·C
the causal counterfactual A = 0 C = 1 (‘had you not chosen a, the initial con-
ditions would have been c’) will still be true. So what matters is establishing that A
doesn’t causally influence C. For this purpose, it won’t matter whether the selection
function is miraculous or backtracking. Begin with the miraculous understanding.
Suppose—for reductio—that there’s some set of variables, Q, including A, which is
such that Q∪ {C} are distinct. Additionally suppose that there’s a surjective function
ψ such that C = ψ(Q) is true in all of the not too different worlds in which Q = q,
for every assignment of values q. Because Q∪ {C} are distinct, the variables in Q do
not concern the state of the world at the initial conditions. Since the initial conditions
are initial, the variables in Q must concern the state of the world at times after the
initial conditions. Therefore, on the miraculous understanding, for every assignment
q, s(Q = q,w) contains worlds with the same initial conditions as w. So it contains
worlds at which C = 1. So, for every assignment q, ψ(q) = 1. But then ψ is a con-
stant function, not a surjective function. Contradiction. So if we adopt a miraculous
understanding of the selection function, there is no variable set containing A which
causally influences C.
Next, consider the backtracking understanding. Suppose—for reductio—that there’s
a set of variables, Q, containing A, and a function ψ such that C = ψ(Q) is true
throughout the worlds in s(Q = q,w), for every assignment q. Consider the actual
assignment qw. By weak centring, s(Q = qw,w) contains w. And by stipulation, at w
the initial conditions are c. So ψ(qw) = 1. But since s(Q = qw,w) must contain some
non-actual worlds (as I argued in §4.1), it must also contain some worlds at which
the initial conditions are not c (given the backtracking understanding of the selection
function). So we have that ψ(qw) = 0. Contradiction. So if we adopt a backtrack-
ing understanding of the selection function, then there is no variable set containingA
which causally influences C.
Eitherway, then,Adoes not causally influenceC. Assuming thatC doesn’t causally
influenceA—though, again, this doesn’t ultimatelymatter—condition (E3) is satisfied.
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So the modelMpast is correct. And so, given the semantics (→), the causal counter-
factual ‘if you hadn’t chosen a, the initial conditions would have been c’ (B2) is true.
5 Further Discussion
I’ve shown that, if we reject strong centring, then the causal model semantics (→)
described in §2, together with the theory of Causal Influence from §3, satisfies (B1)
and (B2). Since it clearly satisfies (B3), it must violate the schematic principle (B4)
(B4) If PQ, P R, andQ∧Rmetaphysically necessitates S , then P S .
However, the foregoing does notmake it clearwhy the semantics violates this principle.
In this section, I will explain that condition (E1) from Causal Influence leads to
(B4) being violated. This discussion will put us in a position to appreciate that the
theory from §§2–3 will not tell us that the causal counterfactual (G1) is true.
(G1) If you hadn’t chosen a, it would have been the case that either the initial condi-
tions were different or there was a miracle.
5.1 Principle (B4) and Mereological Distinctness
It’s tempting to think that the the principle (B4) fails on this semantics because causal
influence need not be preserved through metaphysical necessitation. Consider this
case: whether the doctor gives morphine causally influences whether the patient dies
painlessly. So we get the causal counterfactual ‘had the doctor given the patient mor-
phine, they would have died painlessly’. If the patient dies painlessly, this metaphys-
ically necessitates that the patient dies. But whether the doctor gives morphine does
not causally influence whether the patient dies. So—you may think—we don’t get the
causal counterfactual ‘had the doctor given the patient morphine, they would have
died.’
This thought is tempting but wrong. The reason it is wrong is that the seman-
tics (→) does not require there to be causal influence between the antecedent and
the consequent. Indeed, the counterfactuals (B1) and (B2) are true precisely because
there is not any causal influence between whether you choose a and whether there’s a
miracle, nor between whether you choose A and whether the initial conditions are c.
Suppose that, if the doctor fails to give morphine to a dying patient, or gives morphine
to a patient who isn’t dying, then they will be disciplined. Then, we will have a causal
model according to which whether the doctor givesmorphine and whether the patient
dies both causally influence whether the doctor is disciplined, and whether the doctor
gives morphine does not causally influence whether the patient dies. And this causal
model will tell us that ‘had the doctor given morphine, the patient would still have
died’ is true. (Or, more trivially, just take a causal model in which both whether the
doctor gives morphine and whether the patient dies are exogenous variables, and there
are no endogenous variables or structural equations. This model will tell us that, had
the doctor not given morphine, the patient would still have died. And all it will take
27 of 31
causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
for this model to be correct is for the exogenous variables to be distinct, which they
are, and for them to not causally influence each other, which they do not.)
Instead, the reason that (B4) fails is the requirement of mereological distinctness,
(E1). Though there is no causal influence leading fromA toM , and no causal influence
leading fromA toC, we cannot have a causal model which includes all three variables,




Any system of structural equations which includes all three variablesA,M, andC will
be incorrect. For the value ofA is not fixable independently of the values ofM andC. If
M = 0 andC = 1, this metaphysically necessitates thatA = 1, and it will be impossible
for us to setA = 0whileM is set to 0 andC is set to 1. That is: if the initial conditions
are c and there’s no violation of the actual laws of nature, then it will be impossible for
you to not choose a. So the variables in {A,M,C} are not mereologically distinct, and
condition (E1) tells us that no causal model containing these variables can be correct.
So the causal modelling semantics (→) I outlined in §3 will not say that the coun-
terfactual (G1) is true, nor that the counterfactual (G2) is false.
(G1) If you hadn’t chosen a, it would have been the case that either the initial condi-
tions were different or there was a miracle.
(G2) If you hadn’t chosen a, it would have been the case that the initial conditions
were different and there was a miracle.
Neither will it say that (G1) is false, nor that (G2) is true. Just as truth requires a vali-
dating model, falsehood requires a model which validates the negation. And, when it
comes to counterfactuals like (G1) and (G2), there is no causal model which contains
variables for both the antecedents and the consequents. So, when it comes to coun-
terfactuals like these, the semantics (→) simply falls silent. It does not say that they
are true, nor does it say that they are false. The account could be supplemented to say
that, when there are metaphysically necessary connections between antecedent and
consequent, the causal counterfactuals are vacuously false or indeterminate. (If forced
to choose, I would favour the latter option myself, but I don’t currently see anything
important that hangs on the choice.)
5.2 Betting on the past and a miracle
Turning to causal decision theory, the discussion from §5.1 above is relevant to deci-
sions like the following.
Betting on the past and a miracle You are certain that the laws are deterministic, that
there are not and never will be any miracles, and that the initial conditions were
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c. You are offered a choice between two bets, a and b. Both bet a and bet b are
bets on the following proposition: there are no miracles, and the initial condi-
tions are c. If you take bet a and this proposition is true, then you’ll win $10;
whereas if you take bet a and the proposition is false, you’ll get nothing. If you
take bet b and this proposition is true, then you’ll gain $1; whereas, if you take
bet b and the proposition is false, then you’ll gain $11.
There are no miracles and Either there are miracles or
the initial conditions are c the initial conditions are not c
Bet a $10 $0
Bet b $1 $11
Betting on the past and a miracle is a combination of the decisions Betting on a mir-
acle and Betting on the past. If we suppose that causal counterfactuals like (G1) are
true, then CDT will say that you are required to take bet b. To appreciate this, con-
sider what the utilities of a and b would be, were you certain that you actually take a.
In that case, because Pr(a$10 | a) = 100%, the utility of a would be the desirabil-
ity of $10, U (a | a) = D($10). And because Pr(b$11 | a) = 100%, the utility of b
would be the desirability of $11,U (b | a) =D($11). Since $11 is more desirable than $10,
U (a | a) < U (b | a). On the other hand, consider what the utilities of a and b would be,
were you certain that you actually take b. Then, we’d have Pr(a$0 | b) = 100% and
Pr(b $1 | b) = 100%. So we’d have U (a | b) =D($0) and U (b | b) =D($1). Since $1
is more desirable than $0, U (a | b) < U (b | b). So, appealing to the general fact that,
if U (a | a) < U (b | a) and U (a | b) < U (b | b), then U (a) < U (b), we would have that
U (a) < U (b), and CDT would say that you’re rationally required to take bet b.
Condition (E1) prevents us fromfinding a causalmodel which vindicates the causal
counterfactual (G1). So, if CDT is wedded with the semantics from §3, it will not tell
us that we are rationally required to take bet b. However, neither will it tell us that
we are rationally required to take bet a. In order to issue judgements about rational
choice, CDT requires causal counterfactual conditionals specifying what would hap-
pen, were you to choose each of the options in each possible state of nature. If there
are no causal counterfactuals like these, then CDT falls silent, and says nothing about
rational choice.
If there were a clear rational choice to be made in this decision, then it could be
held as a mark against CDT that it fails to advise you to make that choice. However, it
is not clear what choice is rational here. If it is outside of your control whether there
are no miracles and the initial conditions are c, then it seems clear to me that you
should take bet a, and that taking bet b is irrational, given your beliefs. However, it
is not clear to me that this is outside of your control. I am inclined to accept a causal
counterfactual analysis of what is outside of your control, saying that whether P is
outside of your control iff P ’s truth-value does not (causally) counterfactually depend
uponhowyou act. That is: whether P is under your control iff there’s a choice you could
have made such that P would have been true, had you made that choice, and there’s
another choice you could have made such that P would have been false, had you made
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that choice. And whether P is outside of your control iff whether P is not under your
control. While it seems that it is outside of your control whether the initial conditions
are c or not, and while it seems that it is outside of your control whether the laws are
violated or not, it is unclear to me whether the conjunction ‘the initial conditions are
c and the deterministic laws are unviolated’ is outside of your control.41 There’s some
inclination to think that this follows from the initial conditions being outside of your
control and the laws being outside of your control. That is, there’s some inclination to
accept the following schematic principle:
Agglomeration If whether P is outside of your control, and whether Q is outside of
your control, then whether P ∧Q is outside of your control.
Agglomeration is a key premise in van Inwagen (1983)’s consequence argument for
incompatibilism—indeed, the same instance of the principle that we are interested in
here is the one used in that argument.42 However, despite its plausibility, Agglomera-
tion is false. Consider the following counterexample, from McKay & Johnson (1996):
there is a coin which you do not actually flip, but which you could have flipped. Let
‘¬H ’ be ‘the coin does not land heads’, and let ‘¬T ’ be ‘the coin does not land tails’.
Whether the coin lands heads or not is not under your control. There is no choice
you could have made such that ‘¬H ’ would have been false, had you made that choice.
Likewise, whether the coin lands tails or not is not under your control. There is no
choice you could have made such that ‘¬T ’ would have been false, had you made that
choice. But the conjunction ‘¬H∧¬T ’ is under your control. If you were to not flip the
coin, this proposition would be true; and if you were to flip it, the proposition would
be false (since the coin would either land heads or tails).43 So Agglomeration is false,
despite how appealing the principle appears when considered in the abstract.
On the view I have been developing here, the relevant instance of Agglomeration
(“If whether the initial conditions are c is outside of your control, and whether the laws
are unviolated is outside of your control, then whether the initial conditions are c and
the laws are unviolated is outside of your control”) has a determinately true antecedent,
but the view itself takes no stand on whether the consequent is determinately true,
determinately false, or indeterminate. If there were a clear answer to the question of
whether the conjunction “the initial conditions are c and the laws are unviolated” is
under your control, then the account could easily be supplemented with this answer.
However, I do not believe that there is a clear answer to this question.
Suppose that it is not you, but someone else, who faces this choice. And suppose
that you know all of the relevant facts. Suppose that the laws are deterministic, that
41. When I say that a proposition, P , is outside of your control, I just mean that whether P is outside of your
control.
42. This is the principle used in what Huemer (2000) calls ‘the second version’ of the consequence argument.
Huemer calls it ‘β∗’. As Huemer shows, this alternative formulation is equivalent to the original, in the sense
that the principles α∗ and β∗ used in the second version are equivalent to the principles α and β used in the
original argument.
43. Similar counterexamples are discussed in Widerker (1987) and Huemer (2000).
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there are no miracles, and that the initial conditions are c. You watch this person take
bet b, and gain $1. Ask yourself: did this person make the choice which was objec-
tively best? That is: did their choice maximise objective instrumental value?44 From
my perspective, it is unclear. I’m somewhat tempted to say “taking bet b instead of bet
a lost them $9, since, if they’d taken bet a, they’d have gotten $10.” At the same time, I
recognise that them taking bet ametaphysically necessitates that either the initial con-
ditions are not c or there are no miracles—even though they do not have control over
the initial conditions, nor do they have control over whether the laws of nature are
violated. So there’s some inclination to say that taking bet b instead of bet a gained
them $1, since, if they’d taken bet a, either the initial conditions would have been dif-
ferent, or the laws would have been violated, and so they’d have gotten nothing. As
an English language counterfactual, this seems undeniable, but I must remind myself
that it is not a causal counterfactual, and it is only causal counterfactuals which reveal
genuine agential control. So I have two conflicting inclinations, neither of which strike
me as dispositive. At the end of the day, I’m just not sure what to say about whether
this person’s choice has maximised objective instrumental value or not. (Note that all
the same considerations hold if the person chooses bet a instead of bet b. In that case,
there’s some inclination to say that this gained them $9; and some inclination to say
that this lost them $1. The inclinations are conflicting and inconclusive, and I’m left
unsure whether this choice was objectively best.)
According to the causal decision theorist, rational choice is an attempt tomaximise
objective instrumental value. (You make the attempt by maximising your subjective
expectation of objective instrumental value.) But in a decision like Betting on the past
and a miracle, it is unclear which act maximises objective instrumental value in each
possible state of the world. So, from the perspective of the causal decision theorist, it
is unclear which choice has the highest expected instrumental value.
Decisions like these are fascinating. But, if we accept the theory of causal coun-
terfactuals I’ve offered here, they should not be seen as potential counterexamples to
CDT—for three reasons. Firstly, because it is not clear what CDT says about decisions
like these. For it is unclear which causal counterfactuals are true in decisions like Bet-
ting on the past and a miracle. Secondly, it is not clear what a decision theory should
say about decisions like these. For it is unclear which choices maximise objective in-
strumental value in these kinds of decisions. Thirdly, even if it were clear which bet
CDT should advise you to take, the theory of causal counterfactuals I’ve offered here
could easily be supplemented to secure that verdict. So there’s no potential conflict
between CDT (wedded with the theory of causal counterfactuals developed here) and
decisions like Betting on the past and a miracle.
44. I take it for granted that there is such a thing as objective instrumental value, though evidentialists will
disagree—see Ahmed & Spencer (2020).
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